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Abstract 
In this paper, we consider whether or not inequality forces society to 
expend more resources on supervision which imposes an extra cost to 
doing business. Some argue that since inequality deteriorates social capital, 
there is a greater need for supervisory labor which is a costly burden to 
bear. We propose an alternative (but not mutually exclusive) explanation. 
We argue that the war on drugs leads to institutional decay and lower 
levels of trust which, in turn, force private actors to deploy resources to 
supervise workers and protect themselves. Our explanation complements 
the argument regarding the link between inequality and guard labor.  
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1. Introduction 
Does inequality reduce economic growth? This question has received significant attention from 
many scholars in recent times (Banerjee and Duflo 2003; Barro 2000; Persson and Tabellini 
1994) and it implies that inequality somehow imposes a cost on future economic activity. Those 
who are convinced by the empirical evidence linking slowdowns in growth and increases in 
inequality have suggested channels to explain why there is such a relation. In this paper, we 
consider one of the channels for extra costs imposed by inequality.  
The effect of income inequality on economic growth is complex. Barro (2000) notes a positive 
impact of inequality on growth through the savings channel, especially in the richer countries.  
Galor and Moav (2004) analyze different development regimes and accumulation of physical and 
human capital: in case if the returns to human capital are lower than the returns to physical 
capital, inequality may foster development; yet if the returns are equal, inequality may dampen 
growth. Bearing the latter statement in mind, most of the authors focus on the negative effects of 
inequality: Persson and Tabellini (1994) suggest the policy-related channel, through which 
inequality stimulates introduction and conduct of policies endangering property rights; Robert 
Fogel (2000) argued that inequality could reduce growth if the poor suffered from poor health 
that prevented investments in human capital; other authors (Voitchovsky 2009; Aghion, Caroli 
and García-Peñalosa 1999) focus on the political economy of inequality. The latter viewpoint 
suggests that inequality, if it is perceived as a sign of low social mobility, may undermine public 
support for pro-growth policies. This is a ‘political economy’ argument in the sense that it relates 
to the role of institutions. Samuel Bowles (2012) and Jayadev and Bowles (2006; 2014) fleshed 
out this position in their study of ‘guard labor’. Their contention is that inequality reduces trust. 
In turn, this incites employers and firms to spend more resources on ‘guard labor’ which they 
define as anyone who is tasked with supervision of other individuals in or out of the workforce. 
The greater expenses incurred on guard labor represent high transaction costs. Bowles and 
Jayadev (2014) present their argument by showing that countries with greater levels of inequality 
are also countries where guard labor comprises a greater portion of the workforce. 
 In this article, we do not dispute that trust affects the need for guard labor which in turn 
may hinder economic activity. However, we argue that there is another channel by which 
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employment of guard labor can be explained. . This alternative is an institutional failure that is 
coincidental with inequality: government efforts at enforcing prohibitions against drugs, alcohol, 
tobacco and guns. Since increases in enforcement efforts of drug and alcohol prohibition tend to 
increase homicide rates (Miron 1999) by forcing criminals to resort to violence to adjudicate 
conflicts related to illicit activities, there are spillovers into the wider society that deteriorate 
trust. This, in turn, stimulates a greater demand for guard labor which is the cost of doing 
business. 
 In essence, we argue that violence results from a demand for dispute resolution which is 
driven by the level of prohibition enforcement efforts. This demand for dispute resolution then 
spills over into non-criminal spheres of society. Once this occurs, non-criminal firms are forced 
to expend more resources on security or supervision.  
 Our paper is divided as follows: in Section 2, we explain the theoretical and empirical 
underpinnings of how guard labor may impose costs on society and how inequality might induce 
a greater demand for guard labor (we call this channel the ‘inequality channel’); in Section 3, we 
propose our argument that prohibition efforts determine the demand for guard labor (we call our 
channel the ‘prohibition channel’); in Section 4, we present the empirical evidence that 
substantiates our claim regarding the ‘prohibition channel’.  
 Our results suggest that the level of prohibition enforcement efforts, measured by 
different indicators, are stronger predictors of guard labor demand than inequality is. We also 
point out that the ‘inequality channel’ is not robust to the type of inequality measure used (before 
or after taxes) while the ‘prohibition channel’ is robust to changes in specifications.  
 
2. Is inequality a market failure? 
This is essentially the question that Samuel Bowles (Bowles and Gintis 2002; Bowles 2012) 
asks, albeit he prefers to use the term ‘coordination failure’ (2012: 4). For a market failure to 
occur, there must be an externality generated by inequality that prevents some of the gains from 
exchange from being realized. In Bowles’s argument, income inequality generates a negative 
externality in the form of lower levels of trust. In turn, this amplifies any principal-agent 
problems. Employers feel that they cannot trust their workers as both groups are socially distant 
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(Maskin and Tirole 1990). This amplification of the principal-agent problem forces a greater 
amount of effort and resources to be expended on monitoring workers. Without ‘costly 
monitoring’, productivity will be adversely affected but ‘monitoring uses up resources that could 
have otherwise been productively employed’ (Bowles 2012: 6). Basically, Bowles (alongside 
Herbert Gintis (2002) and Arjun Jayadev (2006)) is arguing that inequality, two steps removed, 
increases transaction costs and reduces the size of the market. By degrading trust, inequality 
becomes an externality that leads to a ‘market failure’. Citing John Stuart Mill, Bowles and 
Jayadev (2006: 344-45) summarize the point cogently: it is lamentable to think how a great 
proportion of all efforts and talents (…) are employed in merely neutralizing one another.  
 To make their claim, they use a measure of guard labor which they define broadly as 
anyone who is involved in supervising workers or controlling others: supervisory labor, private 
guards, police officers, correctional officers, judicial and penal employees, military personnel 
and department of defense employees. For some unspecified reason, they also add the number of 
prisoners and unemployed workers. Then, they look for correlates of guard labor – one of which 
is inequality. Elsewhere, they also present a variable titled ‘protective services’ (Bowles and 
Jayadev 2007; Bowles 2012) and point out the correlation between that variable and inequality as 
evidence for the axiomatic claims they advance.  
 There is merit to elements of this argument. Bowles and Jayadev (2006: 345) present the 
monitoring efforts to solve the principal-agent problem as ‘the costly exercise of power by 
private economic actors’. This exercise of power, in their eyes, results from the perceived 
inequalities between principals and agents and that agents perceive as illegitimate.1 The 
illegitimacy of the inequalities is the source of social distance. The exercise of power is not 
costless (Buchanan and Tullock 1962) and it is easy to see the need for trust to reduce transaction 
costs. As an informal institution, trust complements formal institutions like enforceable contracts 
(Hart 1995). It reduces the costs of transacting with other parties by reducing uncertainties 
through reputational mechanisms (Stringham 2015), or through widely shared social norms 
(Ostrom and Schwab 2012). Thus, reductions in trust can lead to the nefarious outcomes 
                                                          
1 It is worth underlining that Welch (1999) made a similar argument arguing that certain forms of inequality were 
tolerable to the eyes of the public. Those inequalities, emerging from merit and voluntary exchange, or that emerge 
in the presence of the possibility of upward socioeconomic mobility, are not perceived as problematic. Although he 
does not explicitly make this point, Bowles’s frequent references to ‘illegitimate’ inequalities suggest that he is 
aware of this point and that he implicitly makes the distinction.  
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bemoaned by Bowles and his acolytes. This empirical channel has been well documented 
elsewhere (Zak and Knack 2001). Consequently, this argument should not be disregarded since 
private security employees in the US outnumber sworn police officers by a ratio of three to one 
(Nalla and Crichlow 2014: 1) and more than one million Americans work in that industry. The 
size of the industry alone warrants consideration if there is an overprovision of security in the 
United States as a result of inequality.  
 However, if distrust is costly, it represents a transaction cost that entrepreneurs can 
reduce to their profit. Identifying this cost and dealing with it unleashes exchanges that can be 
profitable (Milgrom, North and Weingast 1990; Greif 1993; Ellickson 1994; Anderson and Hill 
2004; Volckart 1999; Benson 1990 [2011]). It is a $100 bill on the sidewalk waiting to be picked 
up. Thus, there is an incentive to reduce transaction costs by creating mechanisms that reinforce 
trust. Even large and socially diverse populations are able to generate, in the presence of a 
favorable legal environment, governance structures that promote trust by reducing social distance 
(Leeson 2014; 15-31). By recognizing that markets are able to generate solutions to the issue of 
low levels of trust,2 we can then ask what barriers are preventing the emergence of private 
solutions to the cost of distrust.  
 
3. Guard labor as the outcome of ‘government failure’ 
Can we consider that the non-optimal demand for guard labor might result from a political 
failure rather than a market failure? Might it be only coincidentally correlated with inequality? 
Basically, we explore the possibility that there is a government failure that co-exists with the 
inequality story advanced by Bowles. 
For example, consider the role of public policing, in which there can be government 
failure. The quality of the public good of policing may decline as a result of the political 
processes that generate appointments in a police force. Moreover, special interest groups may 
influence the allocation of investigative and policing resources so as to reduce the quality of the 
                                                          
2 We point to the work of Mathers and Williamson (2011) in support of this contention. They show that at low levels 
of economic freedom, cultural factors determining trust have a positive effect on growth. Thus, unfree economies 
with low levels of trust will experience less growth than unfree economies with high levels of trust. However, in 
freer countries, they found that both trust and economic freedom matter for growth suggesting that in free 
economies, the two are complements to one another (p.326).  
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good produced (Benson 1990 [2011]: 276-277). In such a situation, private actors, who still pay 
for a public police force through taxes, but who do not obtain the benefit of protection, may be 
forced to expend extra resources to protect themselves. Thus, the private response is an efficient 
response to the poor provision of public policing, even if it leads to an over-optimal provision of 
policing.3  
An analogous argument was discussed implicitly by Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003). They presented an interpretation of institutions using an 
institutional possibilities frontier representing the various combinations of private and public 
institutions available to a society. The argument is that there are social losses linked to private 
disorder which have to be traded off against social losses from greater state control, basically a 
trade-off between private order and public order. As a result, the frontier resembled a production 
function isoquant, or indifference curve in utility analysis, with trade-offs between the different 
forms of losses. By definition, they assumed that there was convexity. Nonetheless, they briefly 
mention what would happen in the absence of convexity. Greater state control, as, for example, 
in the case of price controls, could increase bribery and corruption to evade this control. Trust in 
public institutions is weakened when there are more forms of private ordering such as shadow 
markets. As a result, some attempts at providing public order force the use of different forms of 
private ordering that may be costlier than the alternative, but still preferable to accepting the 
public ordering.4 In such cases, there is government failure that imposes significant costs on 
society. 
 The complementary argument we propose is based largely on this idea of government 
failure as a result of efforts to prohibit drugs. Efforts at prohibiting illicit substances require that 
limited policing resources be spread more thinly which may force private actors to expend more 
                                                          
3 There is another argument that could be raised but that would require a separate paper: inequality itself can be a 
government failure resulting from rent-seeking (Tullock 1967; Krueger 1974). There are numerous policies that act 
to lower the left tail of the income distribution to the benefit of the right tail (bailouts, corporate subsidies, special 
tax treatments, regulatory barriers protecting incumbent firms, regressive tax burdens like trade tariffs). These 
inequalities can be deemed ‘illegitimate’ (Welch 1999) in the sense that the general population views them as unfair. 
This increases social distance and forces principals to exert more supervision over their agents. As a result, the 
principal-agent problem may be magnified because of a government failure.  
4 In their paper, Djankov et al. (2003) avoid going into too much detail about the absence of convexity. However, 
Rosser and Rosser (2008) pushed their line of reasoning in order to include the possibility of multiple equilibria. 
Their argument is that the benefits from a certain form of public ordering may be heavily distributed in favor of one 
group even if, in aggregate, this ordering leads to a net welfare loss.  
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resources on security for themselves (thus creating an overprovision of security). This represents 
a form of state failure, especially if the attempts at policing these illicit substances increase the 
level of crime to which populations are vulnerable. Government efforts at prohibition of certain 
substances have spillover effects that deteriorate social capital. We summarize this through three 
channels that we call: a) the Miron effect; b) the community deterioration effect and; c) the bias-
reinforcing effect. All three channels, explained below, co-exist and lead to a non-optimal 
quantity of guard labor.  
 In the United States,5 governments have long expended efforts at prohibiting the 
consumption of certain goods: drugs, alcohol, tobacco and firearms. While prohibitions can 
reduce some forms of violence, they can also incite the emergence of black markets in which 
legal recourse for adjudicating conflicts is impossible. Faced with this difficulty, extralegal 
adjudication mechanisms may be sought: gang wars, murders, intimidation, extortion, bribery, 
etc. This is the Miron effect named after Jeffrey Miron (1999) who proposed that prohibition 
efforts against alcohol and drugs in the United States increased the homicide rate by 25%-75% of 
its observed level. Miron (1999: 80) summarized his argument as such: ‘...violence results from a 
demand for dispute resolution (…) the degree to which a prohibition is enforced determines the 
impact of that prohibition on violence’. By rendering certain goods illegal, prohibition increases 
the likelihood of violence.6 In a later paper (2001: 617), Miron proposed that the level of 
enforcement efforts forces the substitution of reputational capital (a form of social capital) by 
violence as a contractual enforcement mechanism. Although Miron did not expand on this, 
cycles of violence perpetrated in marginalized communities can generate a vicious circle of 
deteriorating social capital. A strong parallel in that regard can be gleaned by looking at how 
violent conflicts in countries like Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala and Somalia have transformed 
social capital (Colletta and Cullen 2000) by reducing communal trust, destroying norms and 
values and killing many of the transmitters of such informal institutions.  
 The second effect is similar to the Miron effect, but it amplifies it. Individuals affected by 
prohibition efforts change their behavior in a manner that produces a new, and negative form, of 
                                                          
5 For the sake of simplicity in the presentation of our counter-argument, we will concentrate on the US. However, 
the argument can be easily transplanted to other countries.  
6 It may also incite more attempts at market entry. Although supply is lower due to enforcement, prices are higher, 
which may incite attempts at entry by violent potential suppliers.  
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social capital. Key to this argument is that not all social capital is positive. For example, 
Satyanath, Voigtlaender and Voth (2013) pointed out that social capital in interwar Germany 
served the formation of veterans associations which, in turn, supported the rise of the Nazis. In a 
less tragic form, Ogilvie (2010) documented how medieval guilds used social capital to create 
powerful rent-seeking organizations which limited market entry into their trade. These forms of 
social capital were geared toward outcomes that benefited members, but at a cost for non-
members which meant an aggregate loss for society. 
While imprisoned as a result of prohibition enforcement, some individuals participate in, 
get involved in, or create criminal networks that persist after release. Gangs that emerge behind 
bars can exert influence on the outside community (Skarbek 2011; Bayer et al. 2009). These 
organizations produce social capital the ends of which are socially destructive. In fact, they 
reinforce the mechanism produced by the Miron effect. Simultaneously, they crowd-out other 
forms of social capital. A form of this argument is advanced by Bowles and Gintis (2002: F428) 
who point out the ‘culture of honor’ that can turn ‘public insults and arguments into deadly 
confrontations’ which represent significant costs to the communities in which they happen. 
While the enforcement of a social norm is a form of social capital, its value depends on the 
outcome it generates, in this case, a community deterioration.  
 The third effect relates to the reinforcement of certain biases held by actors involved on 
both sides of enforcement efforts. It is a form of governmental failure in policing. The 
individuals involved in crime are not a proportional representation of the overall population – 
those who violate prohibition statutes disproportionately emanate from certain population 
segments. If certain stereotypes exist at the time of enforcement, they are reinforced by the 
enforcement efforts. Enforcers come to believe that the stereotypes are true and they act on these 
conceptions. Simultaneously, the communities that are disproportionately affected by the 
prohibition enforcement efforts consider enforcement efforts to be targeted against them (Khenti 
2014). In turn, this reduces their trust in the institutions that enforce prohibition. This perceived 
institutional failure leads these communities to turn to extralegal sources of conflict adjudication 
which further increase violence.  
 Taken together, these three effects induce the need for greater expenses on security. 
Firms in crime-prone areas have to expend resources on surveillance materials or security 
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personnel. Firm-owners might feel less trusting towards employees from backgrounds more 
affected by prohibition enforcements and thus expend more resources on monitoring them or 
doing background checks on them. Criminal activities require money laundering which may 
incite some firms to act as fronts for such enterprises and, in turn, this forces more resources to 
be expended on financial compliance, auditing and the policing of white-collar crimes.  
 All these channels would yield the effects described by Bowles (2012), and Bowles and 
Jayadev (2006, 2007) but they would not result from inequality. Rather than being attributable to 
the externality of inequality, these effects are the outcome of government failure in the decision 
to enforce prohibition.  
 
4. Prohibition Efforts and the Demand for Guard Labor 
In order to address the research question, we formulate an intuitive empirical model to explain 
guard (or supervisory) labor with two variables of interest: inequality and prohibition.  
ݕ௜ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ݅݊݁ݍݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ௜ ൅ ߚଶ݌ݎ݋݄ܾ݅݅ݐ݅݋݊௜ ൅ ߚ௫ ௜ܺ ൅ ݑ௜ 
where ݕ௜ is a proxy for guard (or supervisory) labor; ݅݊݁ݍݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ௜ is a proxy for income 
inequality; ݌ݎ݋݄ܾ݅݅ݐ݅݋݊௜ is a proxy for prohibition measures; ܺ௜ is a vector of further 
controls;ߚs are the coefficeints and ݑ௜ is an error term. The equation is estimated with OLS with 
bootstrapped errors. Our empirical strategy is intuitive: we test whether ߚଵ and ߚଶ are 
significantly different from zero. In the inequality coefficient is significant, then the income 
distribution channel is a significant determinant of guard labor; however, if the coefficient on 
prohibition is significant, this suggests that the alternative channel, described in our paper, holds 
as well. We elaborate on the proxies (see Table 1) used for these variables in the description 
below.  
Data were aggregated from multiple sources. The first step was to build the measure of 
guard labor and supervisory labor (see Table 1, a-d). For this, we relied on the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) which provides a breakdown of the labor force by state. We used the year 2013. 
We also had to make some modifications to their measures in order to avoid endogeneity bias. 
The supervisory labor force created by Bowles and Jayadev (2006, 2007) includes police 
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officers, judges and other officers of the state that are part of the prohibition enforcement efforts. 
Since our variable for prohibition enforcement is based on state and local expenditures for drug 
prohibition enforcement (Miron and Wadlock 2010), our dependent variable would follow a 
similar construction to our main independent variable of interest. With this in mind, we removed 
the components of the supervisory labor force that were related to law enforcement in order to 
create a variable named supervisory labor without law enforcement. We also focused on guard 
labor alone which is a large segment of the American labor force – slightly above 1 million 
workers and, therefore, worthy of attention. 
As proxies for inequality we use a very broad range of indicators: the Gini coefficients 
for total, market and disposable income calculated using the census data and according to the 
census definitions; top 5 and 1% shares of income and the Gini coefficient from Frank (2014). 
We include the proxies (see Table 1, e-k) separately in the estimation equation to avoid 
collinearity.   
 Ideally, a measure of prohibition would capture the depth and intensity of government 
efforts to enforce it. Such measures are in scarce supply because they would need to encompass 
efforts at different levels of government. However, Miron and Wadlock (2010) provided a rich 
cross-sectional measure of the levels of state and local spending on drug prohibition. In their 
work, they collected data regarding the level of police and judicial resources allocated to drug 
arrests in order to estimate the budgetary savings of ending drug prohibition. They estimated the 
percentage of state and local arrests for drug violations and multiplied this proportion by the state 
and local budget for police to obtain the policing costs. Then they applied the same logic for 
convictions and incarcerations to estimate the costs within the judicial and correctional systems. 
Their numbers applied to 2008. We rely on their dataset and use it for our estimations (see Table 
1, o). 
 To this, we added a vector of control variables: income, poverty rates, urban density, 
poisoning by drug overdoses (a proxy for demand of drugs) and different measures of inequality. 
We used different measures of inequality (all pre-tax and pre-transfers) in order to see how 
robust the designs were to changes in variable specification (see Table 1, l-n, p and g).7 We also 
compared the guard labor force to the population and the workforce. While Bowles and Jayadev 
                                                          
7 The sources for our variables are detailed in the bibliography 
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(2006, 2007) concentrated on the relation to the overall workforce, we believe that the focus 
should be on the size of the guard labor force relative to the population. The level of security that 
firms and individuals seek to procure is largely dependent on the population to be policed. While 
we present both variables, we think that the conceptually superior dependent variable is guards to 
population. All our variables apply to 2013, except the Miron and Wadlock (2010) prohibition 
efforts measure which applies to 2008.  
Table 1: Description of variables 
    Mean SD 
a) ln guards/population (G/P) 0.462 0.199 
b) ln supervisory without enforcement/population (S/P) 1.657 0.11 
c) ln guards/workforce (G/W) 0.793 0.187 
d) ln supervisory without enforcement/workforce (S/W) 0.503 0.058 
e) ln Gini coefficient, Frank (2014) 1.790 0.026 
f) ln top 5% income, Frank (2014) 1.539 0.065 
g) ln top 1% income, Frank (2014) 1.281 0.103 
h) ln total income Gini, census 1.666 0.02 
i) ln market income Gini, census 4.003 0.044 
k) ln disposable income Gini, census 3.876 0.045 
l) ln income per capita 4.619 0.052 
m) ln urban density 1.860 0.095 
n) ln drugs poisoning rate 1.145 0.168 
o) ln drugs prohibition spending 1.844 0.123 
p) ln households with guns 1.471 0.228 
q) ln poverty rate 1.170 0.099 
Observations 51 
 
 
 We present our results in Tables 2-5 below. Whereas in the given tables we use just one 
control (population density), in the appendix we apply the additional controls: most of the results 
in Tables A1-A4 hold as well as the significance levels. In order to check for collinearity 
between the variables in Tables A1-A4 we calculate the variance inflation factor (VIF): none of 
the specifications reaches the value of four, a rule of thumb benchmark, which points out that the 
collinearity issue, if present, should not be severe. Table 2 illustrates the results where guards per 
1,000 inhabitants is the dependent variable. Table 3 illustrates the results where guards per 1,000 
workers is the dependent variable. Other tables use the ratio to workforce, rather than population. 
Since we were using a relatively small cross-section sample of the 50 American states and the 
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District of Columbia, we applied bootstrapping to obtain the errors. In most regressions, 
prohibition spending per capita is statistically significant and increases the demand for guard 
labor. Increases of 1% in drug prohibition spending per capita yield increases in the guards to 
population ratio by between 0.42% and 0.49%. Relative to the workforce (see Table 4), the range 
is between 0.385% and 0.404%. Relative to the ratio of the supervisory labor category without 
law enforcement to the total workforce, the range of the significant coefficients is between 
0.072% and 0.082% (see Table 5). However, the effects of prohibition enforcement spending on 
supervisory labor without law enforcement to total population are not significant. This was not 
unexpected. While security guards will protect property from individuals both in and out of the 
workforce, supervisory workers tend to supervise other workers and not individuals outside the 
workforce.  
 Of greater importance in our results, inequality is only significant when we use the Gini 
coefficients generated by the Census Bureau (columns 1, 7, 13 and 19) which were derived from 
the less comprehensive American Community Survey. They use a per household measure of 
inequality. When one shifts to the Gini coefficients measured by Frank (2014) (columns 4, 5, 6, 
10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 24), the effects disappear. Frank uses per tax unit measures of 
inequality. We also used the Current Population Survey (which is more detailed than the 
American Community Survey) in order to arrive at different measures of incomes, including 
market and disposable incomes. One has to note that these were calculated using personal 
income data, rather than household. Akin to measures offered by Frank (2014), these measures 
failed to have statistically significant effects on the demand for guard or supervisory labor 
(relative to either the population or the workforce).  
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Table 2: Inequality vs. prohibition channels, with guards per 1000 population 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables G/P G/P G/P G/P G/P G/P 
              
ln total income Gini 4.344*** 
(1.284) 
ln disposable income Gini -0.142 
(0.504) 
ln market income Gini -0.708 
(0.598) 
ln Gini coefficient, Frank (2014) 0.370 
(1.213) 
ln top 5%, Frank (2014) 0.169 
(0.453) 
ln top 1%, Frank (2014) 0.0211 
(0.301) 
ln prohibition spending 0.424** 0.447* 0.490* 0.426* 0.433* 0.439* 
(0.197) (0.256) (0.280) (0.240) (0.243) (0.243) 
ln urban density 0.548** 0.843** 0.884** 0.771** 0.762** 0.804** 
(0.248) (0.369) (0.356) (0.362) (0.376) (0.375) 
Constant -8.577*** -1.380 0.751 -2.419 -2.014*** -1.870*** 
  (2.134) (1.510) (1.902) (2.013) (0.778) (0.660) 
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51 
R-squared 0.525 0.344 0.364 0.345 0.346 0.344 
R-squared Adj 0.495 0.302 0.324 0.303 0.304 0.302 
Bootstrapped errors (100 rounds) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Inequality vs. prohibition channels, with supervisory labor (enforcement excluded) per 
1000 population 
 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variables S/P S/P S/P S/P S/P S/P 
              
ln total income Gini 1.008 
(0.721) 
ln disposable income Gini -0.0391 
(0.103) 
ln market income Gini -0.187 
(0.167) 
ln Gini coefficient, Frank (2014) 0.333 
(0.225) 
ln top 5%, Frank (2014) 0.0993 
(0.0838) 
ln top 1%, Frank (2014) 0.0820 
(0.0607) 
ln prohibition spending 0.106 0.111 0.122 0.0973 0.105 0.105 
(0.0893) (0.0822) (0.0893) (0.0817) (0.0825) (0.0831) 
ln urban density 0.0743 0.144 0.155 0.0966 0.105 0.0967 
(0.0625) (0.103) (0.105) (0.0923) (0.0930) (0.0938) 
Constant -1.509 0.182 0.741 -0.451 -0.0399 0.0254 
  (1.284) (0.386) (0.479) (0.435) (0.263) (0.251) 
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51 
R-squared 0.278 0.163 0.179 0.177 0.172 0.178 
R-squared Adj 0.232 0.109 0.127 0.125 0.119 0.126 
Bootstrapped errors (100 rounds) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Inequality vs. prohibition channels, with guards per 1000 workforce 
 
  (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Variables G/W G/W G/W G/W G/W G/W 
              
ln total income Gini 4.003*** 
(0.963) 
ln disposable income Gini -0.0192 
(0.580) 
ln market income Gini -0.474 
(0.579) 
ln Gini coefficient, Frank (2014) 0.109 
(1.294) 
ln top 5%, Frank (2014) 0.0922 
(0.479) 
ln top 1%, Frank (2014) -0.0778 
(0.311) 
ln prohibition spending 0.385** 0.400* 0.433* 0.396* 0.396* 0.404* 
(0.156) (0.227) (0.244) (0.211) (0.215) (0.212) 
ln urban density 0.530** 0.780** 0.822** 0.763** 0.747** 0.813** 
(0.270) (0.352) (0.325) (0.356) (0.372) (0.362) 
Constant -7.574*** -1.322 0.362 -1.550 -1.469** -1.365** 
(1.385) (1.790) (1.990) (2.086) (0.693) (0.540) 
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51 
R-squared 0.514 0.339 0.350 0.339 0.340 0.341 
R-squared Adj 0.483 0.297 0.308 0.297 0.298 0.298 
Bootstrapped errors (100 rounds) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Inequality vs. prohibition channels, with supervisory labor (enforcement excluded) per 
1000 workforce 
 
  (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
Variables S/W S/W S/W S/W S/W S/W 
              
ln total income Gini 0.791*** 
(0.272) 
ln disposable income Gini 0.0282 
(0.0771) 
ln market income Gini -0.0550 
(0.111) 
ln Gini coefficient, Frank (2014) 0.164 
(0.176) 
ln top 5%, Frank (2014) 0.0506 
(0.0732) 
ln top 1%, Frank (2014) 0.0233 
(0.0480) 
ln prohibition spending 0.0754 0.0768* 0.0821* 0.0724* 0.0762* 0.0770* 
(0.0462) (0.0431) (0.0469) (0.0418) (0.0430) (0.0432) 
ln urban density 0.0537 0.0966* 0.108** 0.0827 0.0866 0.0910 
(0.0358) (0.0551) (0.0538) (0.0569) (0.0585) (0.0586) 
Constant -0.871* 0.256 0.555 0.106 0.307** 0.345*** 
  (0.466) (0.249) (0.363) (0.297) (0.134) (0.118) 
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51 
R-squared 0.464 0.256 0.259 0.266 0.262 0.259 
R-squared Adj 0.430 0.209 0.212 0.219 0.215 0.211 
Bootstrapped errors (100 rounds) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 The economic significance of these results should not be understated. An increase in 
prohibition spending of one standard deviation from the mean would represent an increase of 
12.79% to 14.78% in the guard to population ratio (based on results in Table 2, columns 1-4) or 
from 12.92% to 13.91% using a broad range of controls (see Table A1). One standard deviation 
increase in inequality as defined by the Census Bureau would increase the guard labor to 
population ratio by roughly 20.5% (based on the results in Table 2, column 1) or by 31.85% 
controlled for additional effects (see Table, column A1). The relative strength of our prohibition 
measure is not negligible in this case. Moreover, our case is conservative since our measure only 
captured drugs prohibition. It does not include efforts to combat illegal tobacco, alcohol and 
firearms. A wider measure would capture more of the spillovers from illegal markets.  
17 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose an additional (and complementary) explanation to the overprovision of 
guard labor might have. Elsewhere, Bowles and Jayadev have proposed that inequality creates 
social distance that erodes trust which in turn amplifies agency problems that must be addressed 
through greater expenses on supervision. Through the overprovision of supervision, a significant 
cost is imposed on society. We agree that there can be an overprovision of security and 
supervision that may impose a cost of doing business, however, we argue that the overprovision 
of supervision results from government failure. More precisely, that it is a spillover from 
government prohibition efforts against certain substances. When governments push for 
enforcement efforts against certain substances, illicit markets emerge. In these markets, conflict 
resolution between criminals requires the use of alternative modes of adjudication. This violence 
spills over into formal markets which forces individuals and firms to spend more resources on 
ensuring security. We also argue that the criminal associations formed produce a detrimental 
form of social capital while it simultaneously crowds out other forms of social capital. The 
higher level of distrust requires more policing and supervision efforts. Finally, if certain 
stereotypes regarding criminals exist at the beginning of prohibition, they are reinforced by the 
enforcement efforts. Enforcement officers target certain groups which in turn leads these groups 
to be less trusting of official institutions thereby creating the impression of government failure in 
policing. The distrust creates an environment in which third parties feel the need to spend more 
resources on private security.  
 Using one of few suitable existing measures of the severity of prohibition enforcement 
with regard to drugs at the state-level, we find that the channels we lay out are strong competitors 
to the channel of inequality proposed by Bowles and Jayadev. A change of one standard 
deviation in the level of drug enforcement increases the ratio of guards employed relative to 
population by somewhere between 12.79% to 14.78%. Thus, the intensity of prohibition efforts 
creates illegal markets whose transactions have externalities that require other firms to hire more 
guards to protect themselves. In fact, this variable (which is far from comprehensive since it 
concentrates only on drugs and there are no measures for enforcement against illegal firearms, 
tobacco, alcohol and prostitution) is always significant while the significance of inequality is 
highly sensitive to the measure chosen.  
18 
 
 Future research should concentrate on trying to create more time-series of the efforts of 
state and local governments to enforce prohibition. This would permit the use of more robust 
methods like difference-in-difference or synthetic controls with the use of the guard labor data 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Nonetheless, and at the very least, we have made the case 
that the inequality to guard labor link should be treated with more skepticism.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Multivariate regressions with guards per 1000 population 
  (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6) 
Variables G/P G/P G/P G/P G/P G/P 
              
ln total income Gini 6.755***      
 (2.199)      
ln disposable income Gini  -0.369     
  (0.683)     
ln market income Gini   -0.799    
   (0.546)    
ln Gini, Frank (2014)    -0.541   
    (1.644)   
ln top 5%, Frank (2014)     -0.248  
     (0.689)  
ln top 1%, Frank (2014)      -0.236 
      (0.444) 
ln income -0.483 0.815 0.745 0.831 0.903 1.007 
 (0.903) (1.102) (1.061) (1.139) (1.219) (1.240) 
ln urban density 0.539** 0.919** 0.913** 0.912* 0.918* 0.955** 
 (0.272) (0.445) (0.386) (0.475) (0.478) (0.469) 
ln drug poisoning 0.0674 0.101 0.1000 0.0650 0.0791 0.0770 
 (0.152) (0.181) (0.173) (0.177) (0.175) (0.172) 
ln prohibition spending  0.428** 0.452 0.484* 0.472* 0.453* 0.459* 
 (0.218) (0.283) (0.288) (0.286) (0.275) (0.274) 
ln households with guns 0.224 0.0282 0.00626 0.0364 0.0283 0.0349 
 (0.179) (0.157) (0.150) (0.159) (0.160) (0.160) 
ln poverty rate -0.647 0.658 0.661 0.686 0.707 0.725 
 (0.579) (0.474) (0.462) (0.515) (0.534) (0.521) 
Constant -10.01* -5.340 -3.270 -5.904 -6.832 -7.498 
  (5.255) (5.860) (5.297) (5.811) (6.261) (6.517) 
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51 
R-squared 0.573 0.422 0.443 0.420 0.421 0.425 
R-squared Adj 0.504 0.328 0.352 0.326 0.327 0.332 
VIF 2.27 1.56 1.48 1.69 1.71 1.72 
Bootstrapped errors (100 rounds) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A2: Multivariate regressions with supervisory labor (enforcement excluded) per 1000 
population 
 
  (A7) (A8) (A9) (A10) (A11) (A12) 
Variables S/P S/P S/P S/P S/P S/P 
              
ln total income Gini 1.260*      
 (0.759)      
ln disposable income Gini  -0.143     
  (0.203)     
ln market income Gini   -0.194    
   (0.181)    
ln Gini coefficient, Frank 
(2014)    -0.104   
    (0.485)   
ln top 5%, Frank (2014)     -0.163  
     (0.223)  
ln top 1%, Frank (2014)      -0.0960 
      (0.140) 
ln income 0.383 0.639 0.612 0.629 0.717 0.719 
 (0.385) (0.446) (0.421) (0.477) (0.512) (0.526) 
ln urban density 0.0517 0.137 0.125 0.122 0.156 0.153 
 (0.116) (0.145) (0.128) (0.169) (0.177) (0.174) 
ln drug poisoning 0.0100 0.0211 0.0174 0.00953 0.0129 0.0117 
 (0.0498) (0.0494) (0.0459) (0.0405) (0.0415) (0.0401) 
ln prohibition spending  0.0977 0.104 0.110 0.106 0.107 0.107 
 (0.0781) (0.0784) (0.0801) (0.0862) (0.0797) (0.0807) 
ln households with guns 0.0268 -0.0101 -0.0151 -0.00810 -0.0106 -0.00739 
 (0.0607) (0.0447) (0.0427) (0.0469) (0.0459) (0.0466) 
ln poverty rate -0.0707 0.177 0.175 0.178 0.215 0.205 
 (0.213) (0.191) (0.185) (0.215) (0.222) (0.217) 
Constant -3.610 -2.558 -2.187 -2.843 -3.296 -3.420 
  (2.439) (2.181) (2.009) (2.200) (2.658) (2.838) 
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51 
R-squared 0.429 0.373 0.382 0.366 0.383 0.380 
R-squared Adj 0.336 0.271 0.282 0.262 0.283 0.279 
VIF 2.27 1.56 1.48 1.69 1.71 1.72 
Bootstrapped errors (100 rounds) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A3: Multivariate regressions with guards per 1000 workforce 
  (A13) (A14) (A15) (A16) (A17) (A18) 
Variables G/W G/W G/W G/W G/W G/W 
              
ln total income Gini 6.317***      
 (1.928)      
ln disposable income Gini  -0.152     
  (0.600)     
ln market income Gini   -0.595    
   (0.499)    
ln Gini coefficient, Frank 
(2014)    -0.338   
    (1.520)   
ln top 5%, Frank (2014)     -0.0401  
     (0.580)  
ln top 1%, Frank (2014)      -0.125 
      (0.383) 
ln income -1.143* 0.0324 0.00465 0.0577 0.0289 0.142 
 (0.695) (0.815) (0.815) (0.832) (0.839) (0.868) 
ln urban density 0.559** 0.876** 0.896*** 0.888** 0.858** 0.904** 
 (0.234) (0.357) (0.311) (0.364) (0.363) (0.356) 
ln drug poisoning 0.0713 0.0905 0.0975 0.0729 0.0810 0.0805 
 (0.144) (0.180) (0.177) (0.181) (0.176) (0.175) 
ln prohibition spending  0.398** 0.416* 0.443* 0.430* 0.414* 0.420* 
 (0.184) (0.247) (0.254) (0.253) (0.243) (0.242) 
ln households with guns 0.213 0.0305 0.0135 0.0352 0.0311 0.0338 
 (0.163) (0.146) (0.143) (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) 
ln poverty rate -0.615 0.595* 0.604* 0.616* 0.597* 0.633* 
 (0.468) (0.342) (0.345) (0.363) (0.361) (0.360) 
Constant -5.900* -2.009 -0.168 -2.169 -2.476 -3.044 
  (3.562) (4.667) (4.319) (4.458) (4.151) (4.280) 
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51 
R-squared 0.608 0.455 0.470 0.455 0.454 0.457 
R-squared Adj 0.544 0.366 0.384 0.367 0.365 0.368 
VIF 2.27 1.56 1.48 1.69 1.71 1.72 
Bootstrapped errors (100 rounds) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
 
Table A4: Multivariate regressions with supervisory labor (enforcement excluded) per 1000 
workforce 
  (A19) (A20) (A21) (A22) (A23) (A24) 
Variables S/W S/W S/W S/W S/W S/W 
ln total income Gini 0.911** 
(0.433) 
ln disposable income Gini -0.0254 
(0.120) 
ln market income Gini -0.0767 
(0.100) 
ln Gini coefficient, Frank (2014) -0.0320 
(0.261) 
ln top 5%, Frank (2014) -0.0581 
(0.118) 
ln top 1%, Frank (2014) -0.0409 
(0.0737) 
ln income 0.0412 0.211 0.207 0.212 0.244 0.252 
(0.189) (0.211) (0.201) (0.222) (0.232) (0.238) 
ln urban density 0.0582 0.105 0.106* 0.104 0.117 0.119 
(0.0474) (0.0696) (0.0608) (0.0780) (0.0818) (0.0807) 
ln drug poisoning 0.0147 0.0177 0.0182 0.0153 0.0164 0.0160 
(0.0291) (0.0310) (0.0291) (0.0271) (0.0277) (0.0270) 
ln prohibition spending 0.0733 0.0760* 0.0793* 0.0771 0.0778* 0.0781* 
(0.0469) (0.0459) (0.0468) (0.0479) (0.0462) (0.0461) 
ln households with guns 0.0217 -0.00458 -0.00674 -0.00407 -0.00490 -0.00363 
(0.0411) (0.0296) (0.0287) (0.0298) (0.0289) (0.0292) 
ln poverty rate -0.0275 0.147* 0.148* 0.149 0.162* 0.161* 
(0.112) (0.0870) (0.0845) (0.0944) (0.0949) (0.0935) 
Constant -1.282 -0.712 -0.489 -0.755 -0.913 -0.992 
  (1.050) (1.069) (0.984) (1.057) (1.182) (1.248) 
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51 
R-squared 0.482 0.385 0.392 0.384 0.391 0.392 
R-squared Adj 0.398 0.284 0.293 0.284 0.292 0.293 
VIF 2.27 1.56 1.48 1.69 1.71 1.72 
Bootstrapped errors (100 rounds) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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